Prior work on the commercialization of innovation is motivated by competitive dynamics between startup and incumbent firms and has looked at the determinants of innovator commercialization mode. We contribute to the literature by examining variation in performance resulting from the choice of whether to innovate technologically in new ventures. The institutional and business environment conditions which strategies lead to higher performance for start-up innovators. In contrast to the factors shown to determine commercialization mode, we show that the team characteristics and economic environment play a stronger role in predicting an innovator's entrepreneurial firm performance. Using unique data from a novel survey of entrepreneurial firms founded over five decades and across diverse industries, we show the conditions when technology focused vs. functionally diverse founding teams outperform. In addition, we show that in certain environments firms with more highly original innovations and innovating firms founded during a recession have higher performance.
Introduction
The literature on the commercialization of innovation has shown that business commercialization strategy influences the extent to which firms profit from innovation (Teece, 1986) . For instance, it has emphasized the importance of control over complementary assets such as manufacturing for allowing some firms to capture more value than others from innovation. This prior work is motivated by competitive dynamics between startup firms and incumbents. For example, it shows that the decision to cooperate versus compete with established firms is driven by institutional imperfections in the market for ideas (Gans, et al, 2002 , Arora, et al, 2001 . Rather than explaining variation in performance resulting from the choice of whether to innovate technologically, it has largely looked at the ways a firm's business environment determines innovator commercialization mode. While there is growing consensus that institutions are important (North, 1990) and affect entrepreneurship (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994, Sine, et al, 2005) , the relationship between a firm's business and institutional environment and firm strategy is still unclear. While we now understand that institutions shape founding rates (Russo, 2001) , the commercialization mode (Gans, et al, 2002) as well as type of technology commercialized (Sine, et al, 2005) , we have not yet developed a robust understanding of the role of institutions in shaping firm strategy, innovation and performance.
The literature on resources and capabilities, has suggested both that R&D can result in novelty, which is a strategic resource (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) and that there are significant and lasting differences in firms' abilities to maintain their novelty through their management practices (e.g., Henderson and Cockburn, 1994 ). Yet, it does not make predictions about what strategies lead firms to create and capture more value from innovation. The initial focus within the literature on technology commercialization on the conditions when larger, established firms are better able to capture the value from their innovations typically assumed that the resources necessary to own complementary assets were available (for one exception examining environments where complementary assets are relatively expensive, see Gans, et al, 2002) . Firms only had to make the correct strategic commercialization decisions. The focus of the literature that has built on this work has been on the contractual and governance structures used to access missing complementary assets and the impact of weak intellectual property rights (Teece, 2006) . This focus has helped us to better understand the decisions of innovating firms to cooperate vs. compete with incumbent firms given certain characteristics of the environment. Yet, it has left the broader question of when and how firms profit from innovation relatively unexplored. In other words, these studies relate to the relationship between large and small firms, and focus less on the drivers of competitiveness among entrepreneurial firms. The studies typically look at a sample of firms that are all innovating, and so cannot tell when technological innovation does better than not innovating, or how much better. We still lack a theory of what specific strategies firms use to profit more (or less) from technological innovation and how the competitive environment conditions which strategies are more important.
This study extends and challenges existing work on R&D capabilities, technological innovation and commercialization strategies. While recent work in this area has relaxed the assumption made in Teece (1986) that firms had the resources to potentially control complementary assets (Gans, et al, 2002) , it made an additional assumptions that firms were similar in their innovation abilities, that patents were a unique defense mechanism against expropriation and that all firms had equal ability to partner and cooperate with incumbent firms. First, we extend the theory into an entrepreneurial context where firms begin with no resources and the firm does not have an established reputation. Having no resources makes it difficult to own complementary assets and not having an established reputation makes building relationships and cooperating difficult.
However, we know that firms use several defense mechanisms against larger, established firms to reduce the risk of expropriation (Katila, et al, 2008) and we know from the R&D project management literature that certain characteristics of R&D teams lead to better performance (Katz, 1982, Taylor and Greve, 2006) . The purpose of this paper is to show that firms that are innovating are more likely to have higher performance when the team characteristics, the firm strategy and the economic environment are conducive and aligned. That is, when the technical focus or experience of the founding team enables it to build a reputation based on technological achievements and when the business cycle reduces competition and makes technical talent easier to acquire. Further, we show that the specific strategies associated with greater performance for innovators vary across different business and institutional environments (Gans and Stern, 2003) .
Literature and Hypotheses

Introduction.
The literature on entrepreneurship also draws on institutional theory (Tucker, et al, 1990) . Institutions are defined as the laws, norms, or beliefs, which form the 'rules of the game' (North, 1990 , Williamson, 2000 , Scott, 2008 . Institutions act as the political, social, as well as legal (both formal and informal) constraints on individuals and organizations (North, 1990 , Scott, 2008 . By altering the constraints and structure of opportunities in an economy, institutions direct behavior towards either more or less economically productive activity (Baumol, 1990 , Nee, 1996 . Institutional theory tends to highlight the effects of institutions on organizational founding rates (Sine et al., 2005) , but until recently, has neglected the ways that institutions may influence firm strategy (Hoskisson, 2000) . The ability of institutional theory to offer guidance on which institutional shifts might result in changes in the firm strategies that offer a competitive advantage has not reached its potential. We might expect institutions to have more nuanced effects than shaping aggregate founding rates. Only by linking macro-level institutional changes together with firm-level effects can we create well developed theories of how certain firm strategies lead to the creation of larger, more successful firms.
Our aim is to contribute to the literature on the commercialization of innovation, specifically, the work analyzing when firms profit from innovation (Teece, 1986 , Gans, et al, 2008 , Aggarwal and Hsu, 2009 . The choice between a cooperative commercialization strategy where the entrepreneurial firm is the supplier of an innovation for an established firm versus competing in the product market depends on the institutional and business environment (Gans and Stern, 2003) . Specifically, the type of competitive dynamics depends on where the firm finds itself along two dimensions of the institutional and business environment, first, how easy it is for a firm to exclude others from using its technology and second the importance of existing complementary assets for commercialization. Gans and Stern (2003) argue that when a firm can exclude others from using its technology and complementary assets owned by incumbents are necessary then start-ups become "ideas factories" that generate innovations and sell them to industry incumbents. Here they suggest that performance for start-ups depends on securing bargaining power. When a firm cannot exclude others from using its technology (patent protection is weak) and the value of existing complementary assets is low, then a firm is in the "attacker's advantage" corner. In this type of environment, they assert that for start-ups, performance depends on "stealth" product market entry and technical leadership.
In the other two corners, the predictions are more complicated and ambiguous. Greenfield competition occurs when others can be excluded from using the technology but the value of complementary assets is low. Here start-up performance depends on technological competition. In the opposite corner (reputation-based ideas trading), when technology is non-excludable and existing complementary assets are valuable, Gans and Stern (2003) argue that product market entry is risky for start-ups and their performance depends on the commitment of incumbents to ideas trading. Technology competition appears to be important in all environments but the ability to compete in the product market and to develop complementary assets appears to differ (possibly less important in the 'ideas factor' environment). The specific strategies and types of founding teams used to compete in each of these institutional environments may play a larger role in shaping firm performance for technological innovators, but has not yet been tested to our knowledge.
At the very beginning of new firm formation, firms are extremely simple and small. Very few assets are likely to be present outside of an idea and the individuals attempting to build a firm to commercialize that idea. Following Schumpeter (1942) and others, we refer to a novel combination of existing factors as the startup idea. This novel combination might involve a technological innovation or it might not. We define new ventures that have a technological innovation as distinct from those who do not have a technological innovation, but may be using an imitation strategy, addressing a new market segment, or those using non-technological sources of innovation, such as a new sales channel, or other business model innovation.
We are interested in the circumstances under which technological innovation is particularly likely to improve startup performance. Technological innovation can have lasting organizational performance effects not only because of initial novelty, but also because of the dynamics associated with startup resource assembly over time. A novel technological invention can also attract talented employees or managers to join the company in working toward commercialization. Similarly, financial resources or more capable employees will more easily flow to firms with more novel ideas, leading to a virtuous cycle.
Prior literature has argued that the importance of complementary assets and IPR protection affect the commercialization strategy and type of competition between innovators and industry incumbents. This work has improved our understanding of how the business and institutional environment changes the type of competition and the types of strategies that innovators might need to adopt. According to the competitive dynamics set up by the institutional and business environment, there are specific factors that are likely to give innovating firms a larger performance advantage.
If the industry characteristics suggested by the prior literature do not help us to understand when firms benefit more from technological innovation, then what factors may be important? A second way in which we aim to contribute to the literature is by drawing on the R&D project management literature to shed light on which conditions result in greater value from a firm's innovative ideas. The literature on innovation and R&D project management has long argued that the innovation outcomes of teams is in part influenced by the characteristics of the individuals making up the team, such as how diverse is the knowledge they bring to the team (Taylor and Greve, 2006) . Cohen and Levinthal (1990) show that firms doing R&D that start with more knowledge are able to more easily absorb and process new information. Prior work suggests that finds that academic faculty aid the entrepreneurial firms by lending their academic networks to aid the firm's early hiring of technical talent and connecting them with technical advisors (Murray, 2004) . Factors such as the diversity of the team and how long they have been working together have also been shown to impact team performance (Katz, 1982 , Harrison, et al, 1998 , Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995 . This leads to our first hypothesis.
H1: Characteristics of the founding team will explain more of the variance in the performance of firms with technological innovations than patent protection strength or the importance of complementary assets.
A technically focused founding team is more likely to have higher firm performance when innovating for at least three reasons related to value creation and value capture. First, a technically focused founding team is more likely to achieve the technological milestones necessary to develop the invention. In an unknown market, if customer feedback signals that a new set of features or different direction of technological development is needed, then a technically focused team may more easily be able to re-engineer the product to new specifications. Second, a technically focused team has an improved ability to capture the value from their innovations due to greater speed in achieving technical milestones, which helps the firm regardless of whether cooperating, or competing is the more appropriate commercialization strategy. Third, a technically focused team is better able to capture value because they are able to operate in a more capital-efficient manner. Managers as well as sales and marketing executives often command high salaries and may add to the start-ups' costs without providing as much benefit while the technological development of the product is still in its early stages. The achievement of technical milestones also helps in the competition with other entrepreneurial, innovating firms when gathering both financial and human resources. Getting through technical hurdles and product development milestones helps the firm to gather financial resources (Hallen, 2008) and it also reduces the technological risk in the venture, enabling the firm to give up less equity when raising future rounds of investment (Gompers, 1995) . Finally, the innovating entrepreneurial firm is also competing to attract both technical and managerial employees, suppliers and customers. The achievement of technical milestones can serve to make these new hires, partners or customers more likely to choose this firm rather than one of its competitors.
A technically focused team can better defend itself in the market because it can more quickly progress through technical stages of development (Katila, et al, 2008) . Certain technical milestones such as completion of design, proof-ofconcept, prototype completion, pilot production, beta version release, first sale, etc. indicate a new firm's development stages (Sahlman, 1990) . Getting the pilot completed and beginning initial sales can also help the firm gain more direct feedback from the market, giving it an advantage over competitors in the product market. Completing more of the technical development and reducing more of the technical risk, enables a firm to be in a better negotiating position when and if it does need to partner (Katila, et al, 2008) . Also, it can better screen and recruit future technical talent (or even managerial talent that recognizes the technical accomplishments and caliber). It can build more of a patent portfolio and have better developed, mature and visible products and strategies.
Once the innovation has been more fully-developed, these technological achievements and lead over other entrepreneurial firms then make it easier to gather other resources such as skilled managers, further funding, better partnerships, etc. Better managers make it more likely the firm will choose the appropriate commercialization strategy and achieve greater performance in any of the four types of environments described in Gans and Stern (2003) . It may be that in sectors like biotech, it is commonly known that a cooperation strategy is typically necessary and so competition comes down to other factors such as putting together a stronger team.
H2a: Entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations and with founding teams more focused around technical skill sets will have higher performance (relative to non-innovating firms or innovating firms with more balanced functional skills).
H2b: Entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations and with founding teams that have more work experience will have higher performance (relative to non-innovating firms or innovating firms with less work experience).
Complementarity with sector characteristics.
An emerging view suggests that the strategies leading to competitive advantage are best seen as differing over time or across contexts. This view is reflected in calls in the literature that "future studies of new venture performance must either more carefully limit their domains or be built on contingency models of performance" (Sandberg and Hofer, 1987) . One stream of research to suggest that performance-enhancing strategies may change over time focuses on the established patterns of industry evolution (Abernathy, 1978) . With a focus on a single industry, effective strategies appear to change across the industry life cycle (Christensen, et al, 1998) and across expanding or declining markets (Romanelli, 1989, Gulati and Higgins, 2003) . While prior work has examined entrepreneurial strategies for rapidly changing industries, these studies have typically been conducted within a single industry. For instance, the types of technology developed by entrepreneurial firms in the independent power sector have been shown to change towards riskier technologies with risk-reducing shifts in the institutional environment (Sine, et al, 2005) . However, this focus has left an incomplete picture of how the broader social environment, particularly how different institutional environments and the competitive dynamics they create have implications for innovation and technology strategy. The firm's industry environment and the correct understanding of the competencies necessary for commercialization shape the value created through innovation. A clearer understanding of under what institutional and competitive environments specific types of assets and capabilities are important in driving performance important to resource constrained firms and entrepreneurs.
Prior literature has suggested that industry appropriability conditions and the importance of complementary assets will be important moderating variables in the relationship between technological innovation and firm strategy. Rather than improving the performance of all innovating firms, the team and environmental factors above may be more important in some institutional and business contexts than others. The specific strategies that are effective for innovating start-ups may differ across the four industry and institutional contexts identified by Gans and Stern (2003) . Thus, we examine under what conditions certain founding team skills and competencies for commercialization can result in performance advantages.
If a firm is in a weak appropriability industry where patent protection is less effective and existing complementary assets are not important for commercialization, then Gans, Hsu and Stern (2002) predict that in this "attacker's advantage" environment, startups will compete (rather than partner) with incumbents and have an opportunity to exploit technical leadership to capture market leadership. The market for ideas wherein startups 'sell' their ideas to industry incumbents for commercialization is dampened by weak appropriation conditions due to the absence of alternatives should the incumbent firm try to expropriate the startup (Gans, et al, 2002) . As a result, the startup may need to rely more on other mechanisms outside of formal patent protection such as speed to market or secrecy (Katila, et al, 2008) . The startup is also more likely to pursue self-commercialization rather than risk expropriation by attempting to find a buyer. In addition, for self-commercialization, start-ups with technological innovations have to make new investments in complementary assets and build the capabilities to compete in the market as well as to constantly innovate. In the attacker's advantage corner, because the entrepreneurial firm must compete with incumbents in the product market for customers, having a less technology focused founding team with more experience and functionally diverse skills can help the innovating firm translate technological innovation into market leadership.
H3a: Entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations will have higher performance in the "Attacker's Advantage Corner" (when existing complementary assets are not important and patent protection is weak) when they have experienced or functionally balanced founding teams.
In the other environments, where partnering with incumbent firms is possible, the way to build negotiating power is to build capabilities to compete in the market as well. For example, if the firm is in the "reputation-based ideas trading" market, then incumbent complementary assets are important for commercialization. Gans, Hsu and Stern (2002) argue that here start-ups depend on building outside options to increase their negotiation power when partnering with incumbent firms.
More functionally diverse and balanced founding teams can more credibly build the complementary assets necessary and more effectively compete in the market. Prior work shows that it is difficult for technically-focused founding teams to build out more balanced top management teams because the founding team's prior functional experiences and initial organizational functional structures predict subsequent top manager backgrounds and later functional structures (Beckman and Burton, 2008) . In addition, the initial incumbents in functional positions appear to imprint those positions and influence the likelihood that the subsequent holders of those positions may stay or leave (Burton and Beckman, 2007) .
These studies provide evidence of mechanisms by which founders bring blueprints or models that then shape the future directions of the firm (Baron, et al, 1999) .
When ideas can be bought and sold in a well-functioning market, new technology becomes a baseline every competitor needs and competition moves downstream. Functioning markets for ideas, which are facilitated by strong appropriability conditions (Gans et al. 2002) , magnify the importance of other factors for firm performance and reduce the importance of innovation. The ability to access ideas and technology more easily in the market lowers barriers to entry for competing on the basis of technology and increases the importance of deal-making and downstream factors. A similar result has been found as industries mature, where the initial importance of new product innovation is replaced by process innovation as a dominant design becomes standard (Anderson and Tushman, 1990) . In the information security industry, prior work finds that markets for technology facilitate the entry of firms without proprietary technology and increases the relative importance of downstream capabilities (Arora and Nandkumar, 2007) . With many potential sellers of ideas, a selling firm's bargaining position is shaped by its potential to develop marketing and operational efficiency if allowed to compete in downstream product markets. Firms that are better at forming contractual arrangements can differentiate themselves since partners with complementary assets are at an advantage when markets for ideas function more smoothly or when complementary assets are important for commercialization. In contrast, firms in the 'ideas factory corner' are most likely to partner with large organizations and seldom need to compete in the product market against incumbents.
H3b: Entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations will have higher performance outside of the "Ideas Factory Corner" (when both existing complementary assets are important or patent protection is strong) when they have experienced and functionally balanced founding teams rather than a technology focus.
When both existing complementary assets are important and patent protection is strong another path and a different competitive dynamic opens up for successfully commercializing innovation. When patent protection is strong, then firms can more easily contract with large, established firms to partner and license their innovations. Firms can use the formal patent system to exclude others from imitating their technology, decreasing the risks to partnering with incumbent firms. In addition, when incumbents hold assets are important for commercialization, then entrepreneurial firms will tend to partner rather than compete in the product market with incumbents. This creates competition among entrepreneurial firms to develop and license technology to larger firms, generating the "ideas factory" competition (Gans and Stern, 2003) . If incumbent complementary assets retain their value and importance, then start-ups have not only the ability but also the incentive to partner and innovating startups compete with one another for partnerships with incumbents rather than competing in the downstream product market. Firms now have the option to license rather than bear the full cost of developing complementary assets and functionally diverse teams. In this type of environment, competition is between entrepreneurial firms and on the basis of supplying innovation to larger firms, making a technology focus and technical talent more important. Since many small firms can now be formed without the need for costly investments in complementary assets, established firms will tend to have many options of who to purchase more incremental innovations from, driving down the negotiating power and profitability for the type of incremental innovation that many firms can do. The other path for innovative entrepreneurial firms to compete is to develop truly unique and original innovations.
Prior work finds that the firms that initiate technological discontinuities tend to grow faster than other firms (Anderson and Tushman, 1990 ). In the case of Motorola, when complementary assets are important and IP protection is strong new entrants do well by pursuing new generations of technology (He, et al, 2006) . In such a case, entrepreneurial innovators have few or no other entrepreneurial firms competing to sell the same innovation and established firms may also have difficulty developing for themselves such highly original breakthroughs.
A stronger appropriation environment therefore dampens properties of innovations that make them rent-generating assets -ex ante limits to competition, immobility, and rarity (Barney, 1991 , Peteraf, 1993 . It may require a larger innovative step or quicker technological development to compete effectively. If existing firm complementary assets are important for commercialization, then startups will want to partner. When intellectual property rights (IPR) are strong, innovation is more profitable due to the reduction of potential opportunism or expropriation and being in a better position to license technology. However, this is also likely to result in more entry by innovators, making incremental innovations in particular less rare and increasing competition among start-up innovators. The way for innovative start-ups to compete in such an environment is by having a technically-focused founding team and a breakthrough innovation that is so original that incumbents have few other start-ups that they could partner with for such an innovation.
H3c: Entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations will have higher performance in the "Ideas Factory" context (when both existing complementary assets are important and patent protection is strong) when they have highly original innovations and a technology-focused founding team.
The literature in strategy has explained performance as being driven by the firm's environment. Stinchcombe (1965) highlights the importance of the imprinting provided by the environment at the time when the firm is founded for subsequent firm performance. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) find that both characteristics of the founding team (including team size, previous joint work experience, and heterogeneity of industry experience) along with founding a firm in a growth market led to greater firm performance. Firms founded during periods of high demand (Carroll and Delacroix, 1982) , during increasing industry sales (Romanelli, 1989) , or in conditions of high barriers to entry (Sandberg & Hofer, 1987) had improved survival or success. Gulati and Higgins (2003) find that during hot equity markets, firms benefit more from ties to investment banks, whereas during cold markets ties to prominent venture capitalists are more important.
Recent work in strategy has suggested that timing is an important consideration for managers searching for new products or implementing strategies (Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky, 2007). Katila and Chen (2009) find that the most innovative firms avoid searching for new product innovations in-sync with their competitors. The firms that initiate technological discontinuities tend to grow faster than other firms (Anderson and Tushman, 1990) . However, timing in the context of firm technology strategy in economic expansions as compared to contractions has been underexplored as scholars have focused more on technology search relative to rivals. Prior work has focused more on industry differences and suggested that in high-velocity, rapidly changing industries, firms must be more nimble to survive. McDougall and coauthors (1994) find that in high growth industries new ventures pursuing breadth strategies with a focus on advertising and marketing outperformed others. Scholars argue that in a hostile environment, firms that have a more organic structure and long-term orientation do better while in a benign environment; a more rigid, shortterm financial perspective improves performance (Covin and Slevin, 1989) . Firms in rapidly changing markets appear to do better by adopting a more flexible structuring and running multiple experiments in the market (Eisenhardt, 1989, Rindova and Kotha, 2001) .
Little research has examined the impact of founding a firm or pursuing specific strategies in a recession versus in an economic expansion. There are several reasons why a firm starting during a recession that pursues a technology innovation strategy may perform better. First, the competition is less intense. As Katila and Chen (2009) suggest, firms that search out of sync with competitors tend to be more innovative. A team starting during a recession has less competition from other firms and this applies to both the product market and their labor market. With a better (from the employer's point of view) labor market for technical talent, a new firm can more cheaply and quickly acquire technical talent to complete development and get past technical hurdles. In contrast, during an economic expansion, the innovating start-up firm must invest more time and money in recruiting technical talent. In addition, there may be more competitors (other start-ups or larger firms) that are also making investments in R&D and competing to develop similar innovations.
H4a: Characteristics of the economic environment at founding will explain more of the variance in performance of firms with technological innovations than patent protection strength or the importance of complementary assets.
H4b: Entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations that are founded during economic recessions will have higher performance (relative to non-innovating firms or innovating firms founded during economic expansions).
Data and Measures
Data.
Despite much work on the determinants of performance among large firms (Schmalensee, 1985 , McGahan and Porter, 1997 , Rumelt, 1991 , and a good deal of literature on when large firms fail (Henderson, 1993, Tushman and Anderson, 1986) , very little attention has been paid to testing theories of performance among entrepreneurial firms (for exceptions, see (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990, Roberts, 1991) . This is an important omission, as formation comprises the events where initial unique assets and strategies affect much of the enduring competitive advantages and capabilities that once put into place form the foundation of many theories of performance (Burton and Beckman, 2005, Beckman, et al, 2007) . If only existing, established or public firms are included in the sample then other firms might have had similar capabilities or similar internal organization but failed, leading to questions of survivor bias in empirical work. Thus, young entrepreneurial organizations would seem to be the most interesting and valuable place to test theories of firm performance because of greater variation.
We use a novel survey administered in 2001 to all 105,928 alumni from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to generate a sample of firms where we have detailed information on founders as well as on firm performance. An alumni survey is particularly appropriate because it enables gathering data from a well-defined population of comparable individuals. Due to these advantages, the use of alumni surveys as a data collection methodology has been growing (Dobrev and Barnett, 2005 , Lazear, 2004 , Malmendier and Lerner, 2007 , Burt, 2001 ).
This survey generated 43,668 responses. Out of 7,798 alumni who had indicated that they had founded a company, 2,111 founders completed more detailed surveys in 2003, representing a response rate of 25.6%. In previously published work the authors show t-tests of the null hypothesis that the average (observed) characteristics of the responders and non-responders are the same statistically, for both the 2001 and 2003 surveys. Industries covered include aerospace, architecture, biomedical, chemicals, consumer products, consulting, electronics, energy, finance, law, machine tools, publishing, software, telecommunications, other services, as well as other manufacturing. Each founder reported information on firms that he or she had founded or attempted to found up to the date of the survey. This new database was further updated to 2006 data from the records of Compustat (for public companies), the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and Dun & Bradstreet (private companies).
1 The results of this survey have been reported on previously . Appendix A shows t-tests of the null hypothesis that the average (observed) characteristics of the responders and non-responders are the same statistically, for both the 2001 and 2003 surveys. Due to the volume of data, even small differences in means across the responding and non-responding sub-samples can be statistically significant. On an absolute basis, the means between the two sub-samples appear to be very well matched by observable characteristics. In only a few instances do the differences between the sub-samples vary by three percentage points or more in absolute value (and for which the difference is statistically significant). For the 2001 survey, only the variables male, European citizen, and Middle Eastern citizen meet these criteria. A key feature of this dataset is its long time horizon allowing us to analyze almost entire careers. In addition, unlike other datasets, there is no venture capital bias in selecting the firms, they were not selected based on performance, and the alumni survey increases the response rate and trust in the survey for the respondents. By sending the survey to all alumni, we have surveyed all those who could have founded a firm within this population.
Dependent Variables
Since our focus is on testing two different theoretical stances on the drivers of firm performance, we use two measures of performance as the dependent variables. Revenue is an ideal measure since it is a common goal of many entrepreneurs whereas not all seek acquisition or choose to initiate an IPO. We test for robustness using as alternative performance measures employees, and liquidity exit events such as an initial public offering (IPO) or acquisition by an established firm. The variable log revenues is the revenue for the most recent fiscal year in operation as reported by the entrepreneur. We adjust for inflation (2001 $) and take the natural log of this measure for our dependent variable. Out of 2,111 firms, 1,370 survey respondents reported revenues for their firms. To alleviate concerns of response bias where defunct firms might be non-responders, we examine the proportions of firms "in operation", "acquired", and "out of operation" in the group reporting revenues (1,370 observations) and the group of nonresponders (687 observations) to this question. Our concerns are alleviated in finding that the proportions are roughly equivalent with 68.5% of those reporting revenues still in operation and 62.3% of the non-responders still in operation. 10.9% of the reporting firms were out of operation whereas that number is 18.8% for the non-responders. 19.7% of the reporting firms had been acquired, whereas 18.8% of the nonresponders had been acquired.
We also have data on acquisitions and initial public offering (IPO) exits that the firms underwent. The variable exited is equal to one if the firm experienced an acquisition or IPO and zero if not (as of 2003). The employee count is one measure of the firm size and a common goal of many entrepreneurs whereas not all seek acquisition or choose to initiate an IPO. However, some firms may have an acquisition or IPO before significant size in terms of employees has been achieved. We therefore seek result robustness across the two measures of firm size and liquidity event. When log revenues is the dependent variable, we use OLS as the estimation method, and for analyzing exited as the dependent variable, we use a logit specification. In logit models interpreting interaction effects is not straightforward so we use recently developed methods to test for interaction effects at various values of the independent variables (Hoetker, 2007 , Norton, et al, 2004 .
Independent Variables
Innovation.
We measure technological innovation in several ways. We create a composite index measure of whether a firm is innovating that combines information from multiple measures. The variable innovation composite ranges from 1 to 3 depending on how confident we are that they are pursuing an innovation strategy. A firm receives a three if it indicated that innovation was critical for its success, if it held at least one patent and if the idea for the venture came from a research lab (corporate or university). The firm receives a 2 if two of these conditions hold, a 1 if only one of them holds and a 0 if none of them hold. In addition, we examine the results using the components of the innovation composite index. We also use alternative measures to indicate the nature of the technological innovation. We measure high technological novelty by using the USPTO patent citation measure for "originality". The originality measure codes the number of different patent classes that the focal patent cites (Hall, et al, 2001 ). For the variable Avg. NBER Originality we calculate the average originality score for the firm's patents. This variable is a standard measure in the innovation literature and provides a standardized measure for the level of technological novelty in a firm. We use several alternative measures as robustness checks, including held >0 patents as a count of the number of patents, and R&D spending, which is a self-report of the percentage of the firm's revenues spent on R&D.
Team characteristics.
We examine three separate characteristics that capture the experience and engineering focus of the founding team. We measure the experience level using the variablefound_before_35, which is defined as a 1 if the founder is at or below the median age at founding for the entrepreneurs in our sample and is a 0 otherwise. The variable serial captures whether the founder has prior entrepreneurial experience. The variable all engineer team is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the founding team was composed of individuals who indicated that their role at founding was focused on the development of the technology (as opposed to other roles including marketing, sales, finance, management, etc.).
Business and economic environment.
We measure the importance of complementary assets and the effectiveness of patent protection in a firm's industry by matching the industry sectors with the Carnegie Mellon industry R&D survey (Cohen W., Nelson, R., Walsh J., 2000) . We merged in their data and to create an average of the importance of complementary manufacturing and sales or services (then we took the natural log to account for the skewed distribution) to generate the variable complementary asset importance. Sectors scoring high on this measure included electronics, telecommunication, machinery, chemicals and materials, drugs, biotech, medical devices and consumer products (scoring low were software, finance, and services). Similarly, we created an average of the importance of patents for protecting products and processes and took the natural log (to adjust for the skewed distribution) to create the variable patent strength. Sectors high in patent strength included energy, electric utilities, aerospace, chemicals, materials, machinery, and drugs, biotech and medical devices (scoring low were finance, software, and services). General economic conditions at the time of founding were classified into expansion or contraction (recession) using the widely used National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee's classifications. The variable recession year is equal to 1 if the firm was founded during a recession.
Control Variables.
Prior literature shows that firm performance is partly related to industry factors, so we use a set of industry dummies as controls for the industry segment (such as biotech, software, and electronics). Since prior work finds that entrepreneurial performance is related to the founder's education level (Roberts, 1991) , we control for the education level with Master's degree and Doctorate degree controls. Since more general experience may be related to entrepreneurial performance and to experience in entrepreneurship, we control for age (Evans & Leighton, 1989) . The variable founder age is the entrepreneur's age when the firm was founded. Since older firms tend to be larger and have higher revenues, we control for the age of the startup, as measured by firm age. Since larger and more diverse founding teams have been shown to outperform, we control for founding team size (in addition to the respondent) and the functional diversity of the team since having multiple and diverse members of a team leads to higher performance (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Roberts, 1991) . Since raising funding from external investors has been shown to be associated with higher firm performance and also may be easier for an experienced entrepreneur, we seek to control for these effects (Hellmann and Puri, 2002, Hsu, 2007) . External funding is equal to 1 if the individual raised funds from venture capital firms or angel investors. Table 1 reports the results of the OLS regressions predicting revenues log(rev). In hypothesis 1, we argued that the characteristics of the founding team would explain more of the variance in the performance of firms with technological innovations than patent protection strength or the importance of complementary assets. We use the median of the ratings on the importance of complementary assets in the sector, l(complementary assets) and the effectiveness of patent protection, l(IPR strength) to split the sample. Table 2 splits the sample and tests the results in each of the four commercialization environments outlined by Gans and Stern (2003) of the ideas factory, the attacker's advantage, reputation-based ideas trading and Greenfield competition. Model 1 in Table 1 shows that the coefficient for innovation composite is positive and significant. However, the coefficient on innovation composite is not significantly different across the four environments (Models 1-4) . While the coefficient loses statistical significance in models 2-4, the coefficient remains positive and statistical tests rule out the possibility that the impact of innovation composite on firm revenues differs across these dimensions. As a further test of the hypothesis, model 5 includes terms interacting innovation composite with l(complementary assets) and l(IPR strength). Both coefficients are positive but not statistically significant, providing further support to the hypothesis that the impact of innovation on firm performance does not vary with the strength of patent protection or the importance of complementary assets. Model 6 and 7 eliminate the interaction terms and the l(complementary assets) and l(IPR strength) variables and we see that the adjusted R-squared statistics do not change much at all. At most these variables appear to be explaining 1-2% of the variation in innovating firm revenues. Table 2 includes variables for the founding team characteristics along with interaction terms between team characteristics and innovation composite. Examining the adjusted r-squared statistics on these regressions, we see that compared with model 1-5 or 1-6, adding any single team factor explains an additional 4.1-7.2 percent of the variation in firm performance. This is 2-7 times greater explanatory power than the environmental characteristics previously identified in the literature. In addition, each of the interaction terms is statistically significant, adding further support for the hypothesis.
Analysis and Results
In hypothesis 2a, we argued that entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations and with founding teams more focused around a technical skill sets will have higher performance (relative to non-innovating firms or innovating firms with more balanced functional skills). Model 2-1 includes an interaction term between innovation composite and functional diversity as a measure of the number of different functional roles present on the founding team. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant, indicating that innovating firms with greater functional diversity have lower performance, and supporting the hypothesis that a greater focus improves performance for innovators. In addition, we find a positive and significant coefficient on innovation composite suggesting that founding teams with a more focused technical skill set outperform both non-innovating firms and innovating firms with a more functionally diverse founding team.
In hypothesis 2b, we argued that entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations and with founding teams that have more work experience will have higher performance (relative to non-innovating firms or innovating firms with less work experience). Models 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 test this idea using three different measures. First, in model 2-2, we interact innovation composite with serial entrepreneur and find a positive and significant coefficient, supporting the hypothesis and showing that innovating firms with experienced, serial entrepreneurs have significantly higher revenues. However, the coefficient on innovation composite is positive but not significantly different from zero, indicating that innovating firms with serial entrepreneurs do not necessarily outperform firms without technological innovations. Eesley and Roberts (2010) provide one possible explanation in that the level of novelty in the technology may influence the benefit from experienced entrepreneurs. Model 2-3 substitutes the number of prior entrepreneurial ventures that the individual founded previously. The positive and significant coefficient provides further evidence supporting the hypothesis. In model 2-4, we substitute an interaction term between innovation composite and found before 35 and find that it has a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that younger founders who have less work experience in general have lower performance (and more older founders have higher performance) when innovating. In this model, we find a positive and significant coefficient on innovation composite indicating that older entrepreneurs with innovations outperform non-innovators and innovating firms founded by younger individuals, supporting hypothesis 2b. Table 3 tests the effects of the team characteristics within the four institutional and business environments described in Gans and Stern (2003) . In hypothesis 3a, we argued that entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations will have higher performance in the "Attacker's Advantage Corner" (when existing complementary assets are not important and patent protection is weak) when they have experienced and functionally balanced founding teams. Model 3-1 tests the interaction between serial entrepreneur and innovation composite in the 'attacker's advantage' environment. We find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term, suggesting that experienced founders of innovative firms have higher performance. Models 2 through 4 test these effects in the other environments. We find similar results in the reputation-based ideas trading environment, however, the other environments do not show significantly higher performance for serial entrepreneurs in innovating firms. Taken together, the results show that having experienced founders is significantly more important for innovators in the attacker's advantage environment than in the Greenfield or ideas factory environments, supporting the hypothesis. Models 5 through 8 include an interaction term between innovation composite and high diversity to test the second part of the hypothesis. We find in model 3-8 that in the idea factory environment there is a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term, indicating that more functionally diverse teams have lower performance in this environment and more technology-focused teams do better. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant in the 'attacker's advantage' environment and the reputation-based ideas trading environment. In the Greenfield competition environment the interaction term is positive and significant. These results suggest that having a functionally diverse founding team is more important for performance in all environments outside of the 'ideas factory' environment.
In hypothesis 3b, we argued that entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations will have higher performance outside of the "Ideas Factory" (when both existing complementary assets are important or patent protection is strong) when they have experienced and functionally balanced founding teams rather than a technology focus. This hypothesis received mixed support from the data. Table 3 in addition to Table 4 models 1-4 do show that having an experienced, serial entrepreneur and a functionally diverse founding team are more important outside of the ideas factory environment. However, this difference is mainly due to the negative and significant coefficients on these interaction terms (3-4 and 3-8) within the ideas factory environment.
In hypothesis 3c, we argued that entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations will have higher performance in the "Ideas Factory" context (when both existing complementary assets are important and patent protection is strong) when they have a technology-focused founding team and highly original innovations. Table 3 , Model 3-8 includes an interaction term between innovation composite and high diversity and we find a negative and significant coefficient, supporting the hypothesis that technically-oriented teams that are more focused do better. Table 5 narrows the sample to those firms that have patents so that we can test the impact of more highly original innovations (avg original). Due to the smaller sample size, we only look for differences across the attacker's advantage and idea factory environments. Overall, the results offer support for the hypothesis that more highly original innovations are more important for performance in the ideas factory environment. The interaction terms in Table  4 suggest that combining original innovations with experienced, technology-focused founding teams is particularly beneficial in the ideas factory environment. In contrast, pairing original innovations with more functionally diverse founding teams leads to higher performance in the attacker's advantage environment.
In hypothesis 4a, we argued that the characteristics of the economic environment at founding will explain more of the variance in performance of firms with technological innovations than patent protection strength or the importance of complementary assets. In Table 5 , we include recession dummy and interact it with innovation composite. The results support the hypothesis. The adjusted r-squared is 0.336, indicating that in comparison to model 1-5, adding the variables taking into account the effect of the economic environment explains an additional 4.8 percent of the variance, which is 2 to 4 times the amount explained by the complementary assets and patent protection variables. Additionally, we argued in hypothesis 4b that entrepreneurial firms with technological innovations that are founded during economic recessions will have higher performance (relative to non-innovating firms or innovating firms founded during economic expansions). The interaction term is positive and significant, suggesting that innovating firms that are started during a recession have a performance advantage and supporting the hypothesis. The results in models 5-2 through 5-5 split the sample across the four environments and show that compared with the ideas factory environment, starting a firm with an innovation strategy during a recession is more helpful in the attacker's advantage and reputation-based ideas trading environments. This result may be because there is both reduced competition from incumbents and other entrepreneurial firms during a recession and the technical and managerial talent needed for a balanced and innovative founding team are cheaper and easier to acquire during an economic downturn. In contrast, ideas factory firms rely on partnerships with incumbent firms which may be more reluctant to partner and acquire technology during a recession.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper contributes to the theory on the commercialization of innovation by bringing to it the insight from the emerging institutions-based view of strategy that firm strategies may be contingent on the institutional and business environment. Prior literature on the commercialization of innovation by large firms has shown that the extent to which firms profit from innovation is driven by business commercialization strategy (Teece, 1986) . Control over complementary assets and intellectual property protection guide the strategic choices of competition vs. cooperation. Specific aspects of the institutional and business environment such as intellectual property (IP) protection (Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2008) and importance of complementary assets (Gans, Hsu, and Stern 2002) shape the strategies that start-up innovators use for commercialization. Yet the strategies allowing some entrepreneurial firms to have better performance than others when commercializing innovation remained underexplored relative to its importance. This paper addressed this gap by contributing the insight that the performance of innovative entrepreneurial firms is shaped by the interaction between the environment of the firm and the breadth vs. the technical focus of the cofounding team. Specifically, there are two main paths by which innovators profit from new firm creation. The choice among these paths depends on the institutional and business environment. One path involves building functional breadth and the ability to compete in the product market, and the other involves a focus on technical cofounders and building highly original technologies.
Going beyond simple descriptive evidence of performance differences for innovators, this paper argues for a deeper theoretical understanding of how in different institutional and business environments separate factors impact innovator entrepreneurial performance. In doing so, it builds on prior work and responds to calls in the literature for research on the impact of institutional environments on firm strategy and behavior (Peng, 2003 , Meyer and Peng, 2005 , Peng, et al, 2008 . Prior literature focused on the conditions when larger, established firms are better able to capture the value from their innovations. Firms only had to make the correct strategic partnering decisions and the focus was on the contractual and governance structures used to access missing complementary assets and the impact of weak intellectual property rights (Teece, 2006) . This focus has left the broader question of when and how firms experience higher firm performance from innovation relatively unexplored. In other words, these studies relate to the competitive relationship between large and small firms, and focused less on the drivers of competitiveness among entrepreneurial firms. How institutional and business environment differences impact firm strategies is still largely unknown (Peng, 2003) .
This study extends existing work on technology commercialization strategies by extending the theory into an entrepreneurial context where firms begin with no resources, making it difficult to own complementary assets and the firm does not have an established reputation, making cooperating difficult. However, firms with certain founding team characteristics and starting in certain types of environments can overcome these challenges more easily than other firms. We develop the argument that the technological innovation represents not a single determinative value, but actually a distribution of potential values depending on its pairing with founder knowledge and expertise in which to both generate and appropriate value from the innovative idea. We find that firms have two main options. In the first, they start with an experienced and functionally balanced founding team, enabling them to build complementary assets and compete (or at least more credibly threaten to compete) in the product market. Through this path, the founding team pairs the technological innovation with broader expertise and competencies for competing in the market. This strategy gives the new firm a stronger negotiating position should it decide to partner with an established firm since it can more credibly demonstrate the ability to bring the innovation to the market. Having a more functionally complete founding team making it easier to build the complementary assets, functions and capabilities necessary relative to more engineering focused teams. This path tends to work better when founding during an economic contraction and when either patent protection is weak, complementary assets held by incumbents are less important, or both.
A technical focus on the founding team offers a second route to profiting from innovation for an entrepreneurial firm. Prior literature has generally argued that a more wellbalanced and functionally diverse founding team is optimal (Beckman, et al, 2007 ). Yet, we provide theory and evidence that in some cases, a highly focused founding team does better. A focus on the technology allows the firm to use several defense mechanisms against larger, established firms to reduce the risk of expropriation (Katila, et al, 2008) . They can more quickly overcome technical hurdles and milestones as well as embedding the innovation in a product. The technical focus or experience of the founding team enables it to build a reputation based on technological achievements making future technical and managerial talent easier to acquire. Breakthrough and highly original innovations reduce competition, improve the firm's negotiation position with established firms and are more likely with a technically focused team. Since it requires competing on the basis of high quality technical talent, this strategy appears to be more effective when executed in a recessionary environment when technical talent is easier, quicker and cheaper to acquire. We also find that it is more effective when patent protection is strong and existing complementary assets are important, such that the market for ideas functions well and entrepreneurial firms compete more on the basis of technological breakthroughs.
Overall, the results suggest that an innovation strategy exhibits strong contingencies with the external environment. Further, they exhibit a strong interaction internal to the founding team characteristics. Innovation and R&D have typically been thought to be a likely candidate for rentgenerating resources. However, the results suggest that analyzing the characteristics of the institutional environment and how it impacts the strategic factor markets, specifically, the market for ideas, is vital for understanding when innovation will provide value. This work may also aid existing efforts to better understand the fit between certain types of innovation and the types of contracts or firm structures best suited to commercializing those ideas (Aggarwal and Hsu, 2009) .
Implications for Entrepreneurship.
The findings also contribute to past work on entrepreneurial performance that has mainly examined factors such as career history of founders and top management team, strategy, market growth (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990) . The movement in the resource-based view (RBV) literature towards dynamic capabilities represents the idea that the beginning stages of new firm or business line formation have been under-theorized. Little research considers the origins of resources and capabilities so a major contribution of this study is examining initial strategic choices and firm formation activities before they have become part of a wellestablished firm. Another implication of this study is for the formation of entrepreneurial teams. While a good deal of work has looked at the composition and experience of top management teams (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996 , Ruef, et al, 2003 , less work has looked at how different institutional and industry environments might shape the optimal founding team. Prior literature has also generally made the assumption that the strategies that lead to better firm performance do not vary across the economic cycle from recession to expansion. Our paper is among the first to suggest that entrepreneurs may need to take into account where they are in the economic cycle at founding when making strategic decisions.
This study helps address the interaction between the institutional and business environment of the product market and technological innovation, technical talent and complementary assets. An innovating firm has two strategic options, they must either focus on the technology, have a technical breakthrough or they must balance out and build the business side and/or have the experience to compete in the market to get into a better position for negotiations. In extending the theory on institutions and commercialization strategy, we have sought to develop a more detailed conceptual model of technology strategies and the process of firm development. The results hold implications for entrepreneurs, especially those with technological innovations, in how to prioritize development of certain resources and capabilities and in founding team composition in different institutional and economic environments. Out of the firms that had patents -impact of "original" patents by NBER measure. Master's, Doctorate degree, and age founded are included but not shown to save space. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are robust. 
